Achieving a Successful Value Transformation: What Makes a High-Performing IPO by Vaidya, Parag
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Research Scholars Wharton School
4-1-2004
Achieving a Successful Value Transformation:
What Makes a High-Performing IPO
Parag Vaidya
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars
Part of the Business Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/20
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Vaidya, Parag, "Achieving a Successful Value Transformation: What Makes a High-Performing IPO" (2004). Wharton Research
Scholars. 20.
http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/20
Achieving a Successful Value Transformation: What Makes a High-
Performing IPO
Disciplines
Business
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/20
 
 
 
 
 
 
Achieving a successful Value 
Transformation: What makes 
a high-performing IPO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: Parag Vaidya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Wharton Research Scholars Program 
Professor Raffi Amit 
Spring 2004 
 1
Introduction 
 
America has always been fascinated by the concept of the strong “bull” market. One of 
the biggest proponents of this fervor is the anticipation of the next “hot” IPO hitting Wall 
Street. Ultimately, successful IPO’s bring capital and growth, but they also have their 
drawbacks. Specifically, numerous studies have shown the rapid decline of companies 
who achieved a satisfactory initial public offering. This semester, however, I have chosen 
to focus more on the pre-IPO stage, in order to examine and profile the factors necessary 
for a company to even reach a successful offering. In particular, what are the key 
ingredients that we can compare across industries in hypothesizing why those companies 
were able to raise a targeted amount of capital? This research will hopefully aid Professor 
Raffi Amit in writing his book “Getting to Nasdaq,” which will profile various companies 
across industries in addressing the issue discussed above.  
 
Given the intense research portion to this project and, there are many questions that will 
still be left to be answered in the future. Nonetheless, one of the main goals of this 
research was to gain a better understanding for the following concerns: 
 
1) Where were each of the selected companies in their growth phase before they 
went IPO? 
2) What are some pitfalls to avoid in order to raise our target capital? 
3) What are the challenges needed to overcome in the evolution of the company? 
(Start-up  Public Offering) 
4) As an entrepreneur, what issues should we constantly be thinking about? 
 
In evaluating each company’s growth phase, it was interesting to determine where in the 
lifecycle their developed product/service was, how many years the company had been in 
existence, and how this correlates with the degree of success their public offering 
achieved. Both the pitfalls and challenges could be seen in analyzing the key strategic 
decisions companies made leading up to and directly after their public offering.  
 
The goal of this study is to decipher which strategic, operational, and financial initiatives 
and revamping were undertaken to achieve essentially a “value transformation.” As the 
issues can be studied endlessly, this research is simply a starting point in the long and 
somewhat arbitrary process of determining the key ingredients for success across a 
spectrum of industries and companies. Eventually, the next step will be to interview the 
companies that leap to the top of our “balanced scorecard” and begin to delineate more 
specific similarities amongst these highly successful companies. To reach that point, this 
study focused on determining and interpreting the common, stylized facts that we could 
extract from our data about various firms that went public and how they differed across 
industries?       
 
Formulation of Research Area (Process) 
 
There were a few challenges in initiating the research portion of this project. The greatest 
challenge remains to decipher a list of companies deemed worthy of extensive analysis 
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for this study. Essentially, we devised “some rules of thumb” based upon the following 
initial criteria: 
 
1) Industry (i.e. Technology, Service, Telecom, Healthcare) 
2) Amount of capital raised ($60mm plus) 
3) Time Period (1994-mid 1998 & post June 2001) 
 
Using the above metrics, a working company list was devised, with the elimination of 
companies who were not being listed on an exchange for the first time. For example, if a 
company has had an offering previously on an international exchange (i.e. Japan), then it 
was not considered in this analysis. Next, each company’s overall IPO process was 
placed into the following categories: 
 
1) Strong IPO: indicated by >50% increase in a company’s market cap in the three 
years following its closing day IPO market cap 
2) Stable IPO: indicated by a relatively stable market cap during the three years 
following the firm’s closing day IPO market cap 
3) Weak IPO: indicated by >50% decrease in a company’s market cap in the three 
years following its closing day IPO market cap 
4) IPO Withdrawn: indicated by a company taking the proper actions (i.e S-1 filings) 
for a potential public offering, but choosing to later retract.  
 
After this initial phase, we determined the crucial dimensions for which we wished to 
compare each of the companies across industry. The list of factors includes: 
 
1) Management of the company 
2) Market position 
3) Product/Technology/Service 
4) Strategy and business model 
5) Infrastructure and Organizational  
6) Financials 
 
Below, please find a chart detailing the steps I took in my research process: 
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High Performing Companies: “A Strong IPO” 
 
The most common myth, due to the bubble and its burst, is that most successful IPO’s are 
businesses established overnight, with a management team fresh out of undergrad or grad 
school. Our company case studies, however, have shown that most successful IPO’s have 
been launched by the bigger, more established firms with extensive track records. The 
companies we observe have managed the bubble shakeout, and currently trade at nearly 
three or four times their new issue prices. For our research purposes, we chose to focus 
on three significant industries: healthcare, telecom, and service. Within these industries, 
four companies stood out in their market performance following their public offering: 
 
     
Company Sector/Type IPO Date Closing Day 
Market Cap 
(mm) 
3 Year Post 
IPO Market 
Cap (mm) 
Current 
Market 
Cap (mm) 
Accenture Business 
Service 
(Consulting) 
07/19/2001 $5,964.84 $8,165.80 
(2year) 
$11,787.65 
VCA Antech Consumer 
Service 
(Veterinary 
Care) 
11/21/2001 $300.75 $1,207.06 
(2year) 
$1,327.06 
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Province 
HealthCare 
HealthCare 02/11/1998 $246.48 $929.12 $781.93 
Qwest 
Communications 
Telecom 02/07/1997 $2,800 $39,941.72 $7,603.69 
 
From our analysis, we ascertained a few important findings: 
 
• Profits matter. Most companies were making money at the time their IPO’s were 
issued.  
 
• Management. The way investors treated these public offerings was largely 
dependent on the business savvy of the executive in charge and his ability to put 
together a fundamental business strategy and direction. The above companies’ 
leadership team was not composed of recent Wharton MBA grads; rather, they 
were executives with an extremely successful track record at previous companies 
(both public and private). The financial success and ability of these firms to meet 
earnings targets, debt liabilities, and overall expectations garnered them future 
credibility in the market. “Accredited” managers are given a chance/break by 
investors, as they are aware of their “industry.” Lastly, the above cases showed 
that “unrecognized” managers with extensive relevant experience could be a part 
of a “successful IPO” while empirical evidence has proven that “famous” 
managers can be a part of the “failed ones.” 1 
 
• Product/Service. Each of the above companies was not entering the market based 
upon a newly developed concept/service or product. Their services were already 
being utilized and the products already on the shelves globally. Thus, these funds 
first served to expand their existing capabilities and core competencies (i.e. 
knowledge management) and second to be put to use in new developments. Thus, 
these offerings were not seen as pure “seed or venture capital” funding to help 
strengthen a promising business model or technology.  
 
• Finance. Many start-ups and dot.coms choose to forecast about future potential 
for making profits; however, while many of these companies have struggled to 
simply stay afloat, the above companies had a proven business operations and 
sales projections. Investors desire to know that a firm will be able to meet (or in 
the above cases surpass) quarterly financial expectations, and that the business 
will function according to plan.  
 
• Company Strategy and Business Model. The above companies had direct 
plans/strategies for putting their future equity financing to use years before their 
actual IPO. These firms established that their proceeds would be used to: 1) 
continue their acquisition and vertical/horizontal integration strategies 2) pay off 
                                                 
1 Tsuruoka, Doug. “How top IPO’s survived the shakeout? Investor’s Business Daily. May 29, 2001. 
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high-interest rate debts 3) expand shareholder base, and increase employee 
incentives/compensation through stock options 4) increase investment in R&D 
and other in-housing company functions. 
 
• Market Position. Each of the above firms had an established brand name in the 
marketplace well before their public offering. Indeed, they might not have been 
the established leader in the industry; however, nonetheless they have been able to 
leverage the equity raised to expand the “total pie” in the market, while also 
increasing market share through investments in marketing, R&D and technology, 
and employee/executive compensation.  
 
• Organization and Infrastracture: High performing companies were well 
established in the marketplace well before IPO. They had the proper logistical 
functions in place well before offering (accounting, CFO/finance, etc.) and act ed 
like a public company well before they became one. As for the organizational 
culture, more research and information needs to be gathered through company 
interviews, chat rooms, etc.  
 
High Performance Example: Province Health Care 
 
Company Overview: 
Province Healthcare operates 20 acute-care hospitals (with some 2,260 beds) in about a 
dozen states. The company seeks to acquire hospitals that are typically the sole providers 
of acute-care services in their communities and beefs up staff and services. They target 
up to four per year for acquisition. Their subsidiary Brim Healthcare performs 
management services for about 35 additional rural hospitals in more than a dozen states 
with nearly 2,900 licensed beds.2 
 
Leading up to Public Offering in February 1998 (Key Highlights) 
 
 Firm Strategy: Growth Through Acquisition. Buy it. Fix it. Grow it. Do it Again.  
Heavy Acquisitions (acquire 2-4 hospitals per year at the time) 
 Acquire Hospitals in Attractive Non-urban Markets 
 Expand Breadth of Service Offerings to Increase Local Market Share 
 Improve Hospital Operations 
 Recruit Physicians 
 Develop Healthcare Networks 
 
 Management: Province’s management and development team knows what it takes to 
successfully acquire hospitals in small non-urban communities 
 Founder/CEO Martin Rash worked in numerous community hospital; served 
as Chairman of Board of Federation of American Hospitals 
 
 Marketspace: Substantial consolidation opportunity in the non-urban acute care 
hospital segment 
                                                 
2 Hoovers Website Company Profile (www.hoovers.com). 
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 Scarcity of High Growth and Quality in Healthcare Segment 
 85% of market still owned by the non-profit sector (rural US hospitals $50-
60bn market/year = 15-20% of total hospital rev.)  
 
 Finance/Stats: 
 Surging Revenues/NI & Employee Growth Before 1998 IPO 
 
Year Revenue Net Income Employees 
1996 129.9 (2.90) 1647 
1997 170.5 4.10 1240 
1998 238.9 10.00 2785 
1999 346.7 14.50 3324 
 
 
Key Observations: 
 
In each of the desired dimensions we wished to study prior to its public offering, 
Provincial Healthcare excelled. The firm had an established brand equity in the market, a 
management team with an excellent and proven track record, and great financials (Net 
income and Revenue) leading up to the offering. Six years later, the firm continues to 
perform at nearly 3 times its initial closing day market cap, and this has been achieved 
mainly through its focused strategy since 1996 of “growth through acquisition.” At the 
time of its public offering, Province Healthcare was becoming a leading force in the 
consolidation of the $50-billion-plus acute care hospital market. Furthermore, it seasoned 
management had convinced both equity research analysts and investors that it was 
capable of leading the company in the proper direction: 
 
In our view, the beauty of the Province Healthcare operating strategy is that it is 
an iterative process: management only needs to repeat its successful formula time 
and time again. This is not “rocket science,” but success does demand superior 
execution capabilities – something that we believe the management team at 
Province possesses in spades. Province’s management and development team 
knows what it takes to successfully acquire hospitals in small non-urban 
communities, in our view, because this team has done it well for the better part of 
the last decade.3 
 
The company realized in its growth phase that non-urban communities typically have 
high levels of patient and physician loyalty that results in long-term cooperative 
relationships with the local hospitals. Thus, while it is a stretch to say Provincial could 
achieve a “legal” monopoly, it was clear that a company with a proven management team 
could achieve and leverage a successful consolidation strategy.  
 
High Performance Example: Qwest Communications 
                                                 
3 Equity Research Report: PRV. BancAmerica Robertson Stephens. 4/13/1998. 
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Company Overview: 
Qwest Communications International spans the globe with its high-capacity broadband 
fiber-optic network. It is the #4 long-distance company in the US (behind AT&T, 
WorldCom, and Sprint), and the company more than doubled in size and gained 25 
million local phone service customers in 14 states in the US with the acquisition in 2000 
of Baby Bell U S WEST. Qwest uses its network to provide long-distance, as well as 
broadband data, voice, and video services outside its local area and around the world. 
Qwest is expanding its wireless services, offered in affiliation with Sprint PCS, 
previously only available in its own local area.4 
 
Leading up to Public Offering in February 1997 (Key Highlights) 
 
 Firm Strategy: Spent years building low-cost networks of top of the line technology 
fiber optics to be able to immediately gain market share (most modern telecom 
infrastructure at this time) 
 Solid acquisition program to accelerate growth and leverage modern low-cost 
network (LCI, EUNet) 
 Pivot from being a telecom network construction company to a national 
telecommunication carrier 
 Sign many deals with international, long-distance, and local carriers and ISPs 
 Strategic alliances with heavy-hitters such as Netscape, USW, AIT 
 
 Management: Very strong leadership team. Company founder Philip Anschutz’s 
acquisition strategy dates back to 1988 
 Anschutz hires Joseph Nacchio (former AT&T exec with proven track record) 
to run company before going public 
 Senior management team has vast telecom experience; several execs also from 
GTE, AT&T, MCI, etc. (steal from mkt. leader) 
 
 Marketspace: Arrived in a crowded marketspace with behemoths (AT&T, Sprint, 
etc.) 
 Very small player compared to local and long distance telecom giants 
 Aggressive sales/marketing expertise and unlimited capacity allows it to 
“influence” market (change the game) 
 Strong demand in market for bandwidth capacity 
 
 Infrastructure: Investment in various systems and logistics functions, along with 
impressive management team give the firm “Unlimited Capacity” 
 
Key Observations: 
 
During the years leading up to its public offering, the firm’s goal was to become the 
“preeminent carrier’s carrier.”5 Thus, it made significant strides in the early and mid 
                                                 
4 Hoovers Website Company Profile (www.hoovers.com). 
5 Hambrecht & Quist LLC Equity Research Report. 8/7/1997. 
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1990’s to expand the “most modern” fiber optic network in the U.S., spreading from New 
York City to Los Angeles. The company positioned itself to capture significant market 
share, despite its small player status relative to companies such as AT&T and MCI. At 
the time of its public offerings, the company was widely seen by investors and research 
analysts as primed for long-term growth opportunities, and enabled with a highly 
experienced management team to take on high net worth projects. Research analysts had 
this to say at the time of its public offering: 
 
With a strong blend of new entrant status and seasoned management, we believe 
QWST is poised to leverage its advanced, low cost network, and expanded and 
improved distribution channels as it strategically transitions to a broadened 
customer, and service creation focus QWST has a large addressable market 
opportunity, significantly expandable as QWST extends vertical and geographical 
reach into targeted markets.6 
 
Qwest was poised at the time of its offering to leverage its low cost network and achieve 
accelerated growth along the road because the market was expanding for broadband 
services. Analysts and investors’ expectations have clearly been met, as its market cap 
currently stands at nearly 3 times is closing day IPO market cap. Its new entrant status, 
broad customer base, solid IT infrastructure, and experienced management team under 
CEO Nacchio’s leadership coupled with a strong global acquisition program allowed the 
firm to have a “high performance” public offering and achieve positive results in the 
marketplace 7 years later. 
 
 
Stable Performing Companies 
 
Our most interesting challenge in drawing conclusions in this study was to decipher why 
each of the companies below was unable to achieve high performance benchmarks 
relative to the ones listed above. Interestingly, when studying these companies along each 
dimension, it appeared that firms such as Petco and Weight Watchers seemingly had all 
the proper strengths in place to achieve a successful IPO. In fact, these firms were much 
more well established in the market in terms of its life cycle and growth stage than even 
firms such Provincial Healthcare. Unfortunately, its long establishment in the 
marketplace seems to have accounted for its stability, as investors seem to have viewed 
these firms as limited in their potential growth and abilities, given their market leader 
status leading up to the public offering.  
 
Company Sector/Type IPO Date Closing Day 
Market Cap 
(mm) 
3 Year Post 
IPO Market 
Cap (mm) 
Current 
Market Cap 
(mm) 
AmeriPath, 
Inc. 
HealthCare 10/22/1997 $374.5 $386.25 Delisted 
                                                 
6 Meltzer, Linda B. Warburg Dillon Read LLC Equity Research Report. 10/21/1998. 
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Ciena 
Corporation 
Telecom 2/7/1997 $3,441 $11,260.33 $2,726.21 
PETCO 
Animal 
Supplies, Inc. 
Service 2/22/2002 $1,115 $1,838.4 
(2year) 
$1,878.04 
Weight 
Watchers 
International, 
Inc. 
Educational 
Service 
11/15/2001 $3,109.3 $4,052.71 
(2year) 
$4,023.834 
 
The firms listed above had a history of good financials, very experienced management, 
and services well-known to the marketplace. Weight Watchers, for exampled, had the 
most recognized brand equity out of any firm we studied, as it was established in 1965. 
The firm had a relatively low fixed-cost model and a service that was easy to replicate 
and expand globally. Similarly, Petco, while perhaps not the market leader in its industry, 
was seemingly grabbing market share rapidly leading up to its public offering, and was in 
a non-cyclical industry. Ultimately, America loves pets and thus will always save enough 
of their personal consumption to feed their animal just as any other family member. The 
only drawback in a down economy is that a premium food store such as Petco might 
suffer at the hands of a discount one such as Wal-Mart. Below are a more in-depth look at 
two of the above studied firms preceding their public offerings.  
 
Stable Performance Example: PETCO Animal Supplies 
 
Company Overview: 
Petco Animal Supplies, the nation's #2 pet supply specialty retailer, is hounding 
PETsMART for top dog status. Petco operates about 630 stores in more than 40 states 
and Washington, DC. The company's 15,000-sq.-ft. superstores carry some 10,000 pet-
related items, including premium cat and dog foods (Iams, Nutro, Science Diet), collars, 
leashes, grooming products, toys, and animal habitats; the stores also offer grooming, 
.obedience training, and veterinary services.7 
 
Before February 2002 IPO (Key Highlights) 
 
 Marketspace: Extremely fragmented. $17bn pet food and supplies industry (grew 
4.3% in 2001) 
 Pet grooming services could expand market to $23bn 
 Intense competition from PetsMart and Wal-Mart 
 Premium pet food market is fast-growing segment 
 
 
                                                 
7 Hoovers Website Company Profile (www.hoovers.com). 
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 Management: Senior managers have avg. of 10 years with Petco, and 28 years of 
retail experience 
 
 Firm Strategy: Growth through rapid but costly acquisitions 
 Constantly reinvesting in its business (though could constrain EBIT growth) 
 
 Finance: Same store sales increased 5% for 36 consecutive quarters  
 De-leveraged balance sheet at time of the IPO (Very strong Cash flow) 
 
 Target Market: America loves pets (non-cyclical industry) 
 Large, LOYAL customer base 
 
Why Stable Then? 
 Competitive challenges exist; more premium brands migrate to the market  
 Very high financial expectations 
 Economic factors: slowing of consumer spending 
 
Key Observations 
 
When you walk into a Petco store, you notice their new “millennium-format” store that 
provides an extremely customer-friendly experience. Its long-term strategy preceding and 
post-IPO continues to be to focus on the increased sales of supplies and services while 
de-emphasizing food. During the early decade, Petco has experienced tremendous same-
store sales growth, and has had 36 consecutive quarters of increased earnings 
subsequently. During its offering, analysts and investors were able to see Petco’s focused 
niche on the premium food market, which has shown tremendous growth in the past 
couple years. Furthermore, for year its has been the favorable victim of a loyal customer 
base that accounts for high repeat purchases. 70% of Petco’s sales come from customers 
enrolled in its PALS loyal programs, and these customers before the offering were 
already spending 50% more than the average customer.8 Most interestingly, Petco’s 
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8 CIBC World Markets Equity Research. 8/12/2002.  
product mix consists mainly of consumables, which “by their nature provides consistency 
to sales.”9 Perhaps these stable sales provide an overall explanation for the company’s 
stable stock price and market cap; the market views the firm as low in volatility and risk, 
but yet also a consistent performer that perhaps offer less in return from a risk/return 
standpoint.  
 
Stable Performance Example: Weight Watchers International 
 
Company Overview: 
The company hosts weekly meetings consisting of exercise tips, nutrition advice, and 
success stories to help its more than 1.5 million members lose weight. The company now 
has classes in about 30 countries.10 
 
Before November 2001 IPO 
 
 Strategically well-positioned: number of overweight people steadily increasing 
(increased from 47% to 61% of all adults) 
 
 Financial Model: Low fixed costs and rapid earnings growth (high gross margins) 
 
 Market Position: Commands unique position in the market (strong brand 
recognition) 
 Tremendous untapped market potential internationally 
 $40bn market in 2002 
 High barriers to entry (very few group-education competitors (Jenny Craig) 
 
 Infrastructure: Simple business operations allowed for US expansion (human 
capital training) 
 
 Management: Current CEO with the company for 17 years before IPO 
 
Why Stable Performance Then?: 
 
 Limited room for Expansion: company is already worldwide leader in  
every comparable measure (thus, the stock has been neutral and stable) 
 
 Macroeconomic: U.S. economy slowdown of consumer, “discretionary” spending 
 
 Highly competitive weight-loss market (South-beach, Atkins Diet, etc.) 
 
 Significantly leveraged capital structure due to Heinz buyout 
 
Key Observations 
 
                                                 
9 CIBC World Markets Equity Research. 8/12/2002. 
10 Hoovers Website Company Profile (www.hoovers.com). 
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Clearly at the time of its public offering and even now, Weight Watchers had a number of 
factors in its favor: 1) the increasing number of overweight people in the world (and an 
increasing percentage seeking weight loss help) (2) WTW’s leading global position in the 
marketplace, (3) the company’s seasoned management, and (4) its strong recent operating 
performance and compelling financial model.11 More importantly, however, is the lack of 
direct competition the company faces when it comes to mass educational testing for 
weight loss. This has accounted as well for their steady revenues and operating 
performance, and smooth expansion into global markets. Investors have responded to the 
low-risk and volatility associated with the company in the firm’s stock price, which has 
been steady since its 2001 IPO.  
 
Stock Performance from September 2002 to January 2004 
 
 
 
Overall, despite its high-growth financial model and high market share, investors seemed 
to have believed that the firm has limited room for multiple expansion. Essentially, the 
firm is still highly leveraged due to its Heinz buyout transaction. Nonetheless, the 
company operates in an attractive macro environment, commands a unique position in the 
market, and has ample room to penetrate global markets (though this will require 
significant effort in teacher training). Thus, it appears at the time before its IPO, investors 
viewed the firm as a solid, yet stable firm, with limited overall growth potential, as seen 
in its stock price stability.   
 
Low Performing Companies 
 
In examining these low-performing companies, one key fact became obvious: these firms 
mistimed the market. In our three more in-depth studies of Teligent, CoSine 
Communications, and Alliance Imaging, these companies portrayed some or all of the 
above characteristics 
 
• Poor financial projections and management (they did not have a proper and 
successful operating performance leading up to the public offering). Their pro-
                                                 
11 Nicholson, Wendy. Salomon Smith Barney Equity Research Report. 12/10/2001. 
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forma projections for the ensuing years were mistargeted, and enabled investors to 
lose confidence in their abilities. 
 
• They had good, yet inexperienced management with unproven track records. The 
firms above (high performing, stable) had management that had decades of 
experience in their industry well before taking their respective companies public. 
Missing an earnings projection right after a public offering is the safest way to 
signal trouble to the marketplace. 
 
• Did not accurately value the potential marketplace and their potential for 
capturing market share. The old theory that its “good to have a strong private 
company as well,” seemed to have been lost to many CEO’s, as they chose to 
great and impress Wall Street Analysts rather than focus on improving and 
expanding their core businesses and competencies.  
 
 
Company Sector/Type IPO Date Closing Day 
Market Cap 
(mm) 
3 Year Post 
IPO Market 
Cap (mm) 
Current 
Market Cap 
(mm) 
Centennial 
Healthcare 
Corporation 
Healthcare 7/2/1997 $219.07 $63.67 
(2year) 
Delisted 
Alliance 
Imaging, Inc. 
Healthcare 7/27/2001 $616.2 $193.82 
(2years) 
$185.13 
Corvis 
Corporation 
Telecom 7/28/2000 $27,855.94 $607.23 $974.16 
CoSine 
Communicat
ions, Inc. 
Telecom 9/26/2000 $6,318.61 $62.83 $73.02 
Teligent, Inc. Telecom 11/21/1997 $1,326.61 $168.42 Delisted 
Aramark 
Corporation 
Service 12/11/2001 $5,011.42 $2,519.39 
(2year) 
$2,892.70 
 
Interestingly, some of these companies might simply be the victim of poor luck and the 
overall macro-economic shocks to the market. Obviously, this issue goes back to market 
timing, but nonetheless, the below case studies provide a little more insight in to the 
differences in stylized facts between the high-performing and low-performing companies.  
 
Overall, there are a few takeaways that we also deciphered from the above companies12: 
 
                                                 
12 Hopkins, Michael S. “Paradise Lost.” Inc. Magazine. November 1999.  
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• Bad Forecasting (revenues, earnings, hitting proper growth targets and sales 
volumes, etc.)  
 
• Pressure to move the stock can change the way executives and companies act. 
Demands to meet Wall Street expectations can turn normal growing pains of a 
company into a crisis. Equity Research Analysts are not kind to companies when 
they miss potential earnings targets. 
 
• Classic problem of trying to grow too fast. Management at time can become so 
focused on building volume and production side of the business that it comes at 
the expense of the marketing operation.   
 
• Entrepreneurs can be poor in running a large company. Sometimes they can 
become too involved and close to the company that they founded; when they need 
to make changes, they lack the courage and confidence to make them, given their 
personal attachment. Sometimes the stock price keeps falling as a result, with 
entrepreneurs going into depression given that their friends and families have 
invested heavily in the business.  
 
 
Low Performing Company Example: Teligent Corporation 
 
Company Overview: 
The company – a competitive local-exchange carrier or CLEC -- provides fixed wireless 
broadband services nationwide using digital microwave signals rather than copper wires. 
Its service offerings include facilities-based business private lines, long-distance, 
dedicated Internet access, and wholesale transport. But the company faces an uphill fight 
against incumbent carriers, and Teligent in 2002 completed reorganization under Chapter 
11 bankruptcy protection and reemerged as a private firm.13 
 
Leading up to Public Offering in November 1997… 
 
 Management: Teligent has superb, incentivized management team (experience in 
building networks and owns 15% of company 
 CEO Alex Mandl was president and COO of AT&T 
 
 Marketspace: Local markets set to open up ($100bn market; $55bn from business 
customers) 
 
Year Revenue Net Income Employees 
1996 1.4 (12.6) 108 
1997 3.3 (138.1) 474 
1998 1.0 (281.5) 1821 
 
                                                 
13 Hoovers Website Company Profile (www.hoovers.com). 
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What Happened: Emblematic of what went wrong with the explosive growth of the 
telephony market 
 
 Beneficiary of financing tossed around (few requirements in regards to controls put 
on the money) 
 
 Raced to get big fast and spent millions building its fixed wireless network of 
antennas in 43 markets 
 
 Investors simply lose appetite for broadband networks & the $$$ runs out 
 
 Trying to “chase and impress Wall Street;” now private firm and more concerned 
about simply making money. 
 
 May 2001 company files for bankruptcy with $1.65bn in debts 
 
 Bankruptcy negates plans of becoming a telecom giant and providing end user service 
to large enterprises; today, Teligent simply an “enabler” (the CD-Rom of the 
industry; just an add-on” according CEO Continenza) 
 
Implications… 
 
 Poor Financial Management: The firm simply did not know how to manage its initial 
seed and venture funding, and thus was forced to go bankrupt after their acquisition 
strategy failed 
 Futile Expansion Strategy: The firm should have used more prudence when trying to 
take advantage of the potential in the telephony market. Thus, when investors’ 
enthusiasm for broadband ran out, this company was stuck in trying to salvage 
“potential synergies. 
  
 Untested Product in Market: Indeed, while some companies did manage to go public 
quickly after launching their firm, this specific product, with its heavy technology 
bias, proved to lose favor in investors’ eyes quickly. Unlike an establish “service” 
such as Weight Watchers or a solid management team to lead the hospital growth 
strategy of Provincial, Teligent simply had a product in the market that had yet to 
contribute positive net income.  
 
 Overall, the firm went public TOO EARLY 
 
Observations 
 
From a positive standpoint, it appeared that the firm before its IPO had a very 
entrepreneurial management team and a small business focus. It had goals of developing 
a critical mass in terms of network deployment and customer base.14 Nonetheless it has 
not been able to overcome investors’ perceived risks of its high debt to capital ratio and 
                                                 
14 Legg Mason Equity Research. 9/25/2000. 
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its reliance on an unproven emerging technology which is dependent on market 
enthusiasm and shifts affected largely by macroeconomic factors. Given that they lack 
the ability to attract funding due to their high leverage, the company is unable to 
continually invest in enough marketing and R&D to increase the attractiveness of its 
product.  
 
 
Low Performing Company Example: Alliance Imaging 
 
Company Overview: 
The company operates about 430 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) systems for 
hospitals and other health care providers in nearly 45 states.15  
 
AT IPO in July 2001 
 Highly leveraged balance sheet 
 EBITDA constantly on the decline 
 Poor operations (its core business continues to deteriorate) 
 Industry/sector in imaging doing well, while Alliance market share decreasing 
 Poor customer retention (contract renewal on the rapid decline) 
 
Observations 
 
Essentially, Alliance Imaging sought to take advantage of strong diagnostic imaging 
industry fundamentals and a potential dominant market position within the industry. 
However, while the industry pie grew, Alliance’s market share went on the decline, as it 
suffered from poor customer retention and a decline in its core operations. The company 
had a number of things going in its favor: 1) state-of-the-art technology 2) economies of 
scale due to a large market presence 3) positive market trends for the diagnostic imaging 
industry.16 Unfortunately, while the company had a very established market presence 
with hospitals and a potential high-volume market to take advantage of, it appears its 
high debt levels limited its financial and operational flexibility (preventing it from 
reinvesting in its core business and competencies). Their high debt levels incurred as 
result of a LBO by the firm KKR in November 1999. Next, its clients leading up its 
public offering were not keen on renewing their contracts, as in-housing MRI scans 
became increasingly popular. Alliance believed that its customers were too financially 
constrained to invest in their own MRI systems, and thus took for granted a customer 
loyalty concept that ended up hurting them in the long run. Next, the market for 
diagnostic imaging services was extremely competitive leading up to the public offering, 
while the company’s ability to adapt to technology changes was challenged due to its 
leveraged financial resources and debts.  
 
Low Performing Company Example: CoSine Communications 
***This company went IPO during the bubble period (2000), but it was interesting 
to still look at given its dramatic decline in market cap*** 
                                                 
15 Hoovers Website Company Profile (www.hoovers.com). 
16 Lawson, Deborah J. SalomonSmithBarney Equity Research. December 10, 2001.  
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Company Overview: 
The company manufactures and markets switches and software used by telecom service 
providers to manage their Internet protocol-based voice and data communications 
networks. Carriers use CoSine's IPSX switches to incorporate virtual private networks, 
firewalls, virtual routing, secure broadband connections, and similar services into their 
service offerings. The company's software (InGage, InVision) helps customers manage 
the functions of their equipment. CoSine's customers include Sprint and NEC.17  
 
AT IPO in September 2000  
 
 Promising but undeveloped market 
 No previous financials 
 Was timing the market extremely wrong 
 Was trying to gain first-mover status in an unestablished market! 
 IP services industry in EXTREMELY early stages, forecasted to grow over the next 
few years.  
 Single product line  
 Very limited customer base…solid clients, but was later hurt by their clients’ decline 
as well 
 Later suffers from widespread implementation failure… 
 
Observations 
 
CoSine Communications was hoping to target an increasingly significant market that was 
estimated to grow to nearly $7 billion by 2004.18 Unfortunately, CoSine was the true 
Internet stock, subject to a volatile and overvalued industry.  Its potential sales cycle to 
service providers was long, while orders tended to be large and sporadic. CoSine’s 
biggest problems have come in its inability to reduce costs and overall large-scale 
deployment problems.      
 
IPO’s Withdrawn:  
 
Sector Company 
Potential 
Ticker 
Company 
Established
Date 
Withdrawn 
Healthcare Alliance Medical Corporation ALMC 1987 Mar 12, 2002 
Healthcare AmeriChoice Corporation AMCH 1988 Sep 24, 2002 
Healthcare Digirad Corporation DRAD 2000 Nov 9, 2001 
Healthcare IASIS Healthcare Corporation IAS 1999 Dec 10, 2001 
Healthcare LipoScience, Inc. LIPO 1997 Oct 21, 2002 
Healthcare Masimo Corporation MSMO 1989 Apr 26, 2001 
Healthcare Medco Health Solutions, Inc. MHS 1998 Jul 31, 2002 
                                                 
17 Hoovers Website Company Profile (www.hoovers.com). 
18 Sue, Mark. Lehman Brothers Equity Research. February 1, 2001. 
 18
Healthcare R2 Technology, Inc. RTWU 1993 Jan 15, 2003 
Healthcare Universal Hospital Services, Inc. UHOS  1939 Dec 3, 2001 
Service AMR Research, Inc. –  1986 Jan 11, 2002 
Service DoveBid, Inc. – 1937 Oct 25, 2002 
Service Idea Integration Corp. – 1988 Jul 24, 2001 
Service LynuxWorks, Inc. – 1986 Jun 21, 2001 
Service YellowBrix, Inc. – 1997 Feb 21, 2001 
 
Key Findings 
 
 Most companies withdraw due to:  
 Poor Market Conditions (Lynux Market Works, Alliance Medical Corp, R2 
Technologies, etc.) 
 Face increased public pressure and scrutiny as they are about to file S-1. Do 
not have proper infrastructure 
 Realize need to stay focused on “business”, rather than spend precious 
management time on potential deal 
 Penalty for not going public is that you still have a great private company.  
 
 Alternative to going Public: Sell the Company! 
 Example: from 1998 to 1999 alone, more than 20 companies sold out to Cisco 
systems 
 Provides liquidity: if sale is for cash. Even if sale is for stock, the shares of a 
more established company proves less volatile than those of a newer company 
 Tradeoffs: Market may value a company more than the buyer’s investment 
bankers. Surrender upside potential 
 
 IPO failures can practically kill a company 
 
 
Literature Discussion (Past Studies) 
 
Much of the discussion surrounding the nature of public offerings has centered on the 
benefits of an IPO and the rise and ruin of many companies afterwards. Market 
performance data, EPS, and other statistical measures have shown overwhelming 
evidence for companies that have outperformed and significantly under-performed the 
market index in the first three years after going public. A study by the Ernst & Young 
Center for Business Innovation,” however, performed an extensive study on identifying 
the keys to a successful IPO. The study identified the practices entrepreneurs take and the 
reasons behind these decisions in transforming their companies from private to public 
enterprises.19 Senior executives were asked to rank the success of their public offerings 
                                                 
19 “Managing the Success of the IPO Transformation Process.” Ernst and Young Study. July 1998. From 
universe of some 2500 companies that went public between 1/1/1986 and 08/31/1996, 1996 senior 
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on a 7-point scale from highly successful to highly unsuccessful. Based on these 
responses, E&Y “identified statistically significant differences in such areas as financial 
controls, employee incentives, corporate strategy, and major decisions made among the 
highly successful, successful, and the unsuccessful groups throughout the entire 
transformation process.” 
 
Beyond statistical measures, the survey aimed to explore the timing of major strategic 
initiatives, the company’s position in the marketplace before/after the IPO transaction, 
the process for selecting the key players in the IPO process, and the senior executives’ 
overall perception of the success of their company’s offering.  
 
Key Findings from the Study 
 
From the survey, senior executives felt that their IPO: 
 
Senior Executives Response (7 point scale)
IPO Highly Successful 28.0%
IPO Successful 31.0%
IPO Unsuccessful 41.0%
 
Overall, the E&Y study revealed three important characteristics for those companies that 
benefit the most from IPOs:  
 
1) Preparation: They systematically implemented new programs, policies, and 
systems common to a public company, in short, acting like a public company 
before they became one 
 
2) Sufficient lead time: They instituted these improvement initiatives months, if not 
years, before the offering 
 
3) Competitive Position: They were far stronger than their competitors- financially 
and non-financially – at the time of their offering.20 These leadership factors 
included: sales, cash flow, strategic planning, and quality of management.   
 
Other Notable Statistics from the Study 
• 47% of executives considered themselves ill-prepared for the IPO 
• 62% of self-reported unsuccessful companies felt they had not been adequately 
prepared for going public 
• >90% of respondents made changes to company’s policies, processes, and 
systems in advance of IPO (operating, strategic, financial improvements) and 
investor relations programs 
o 62% revised financial account/reporting systems 
                                                                                                                                                 
executives from more than 500 companies completed an in-depth survey, representing a substantial 20% 
response.  
20 E&Y Study. 
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o 65% revised executive compensation systems  
o 68% revised board structures 
• 66% of executives reporting successful offerings had transaction strategies 
(acquisitions, recap, etc.) in place before after going to market 
• 57% of all respondents made improvements to employee incentive programs, 
believed to have had a greater impact on company’s subsequent performance than 
all other policies/practices cited.  
 
Overall, the study provides statistical evidence that the competitive positioning gap 
widens between highly successful companies and the rest after the public offering. From 
an investor’s standpoint, the study manifests their large dependence on non-financial 
factors when evaluating large-cap companies. Thus, it adds credibility to the need for 
CEO’s to constantly identify, respond to, and implement key non-financial factors in 
order to maximize the return on their strategies.  
 
Furthermore, it appears that investors attribute their investment decisions to: 1) 
management credibility 2) innovativeness 3) quality and execution of corporate strategy 
4) ability to attract and retain talented people. Furthermore, a vast majority of the public 
offerings during the largest period of wealth creation in the U.S. history were spinoffs 
older private companies.21  
 
 
Going Public Checklist22  
 Is the timing right in your company’s history? 
 Do we have enough $$$ to make a successful IPO? 
 Can the company “afford” the distraction of an IPO? 
 Are we ready for greater public scrutiny? 
 Are our company records in good shape? 
 Do we have correct management/administrative personnel in place (& selection of 
outside team)? 
 How would the company’s structure, key contracts, and relationships be affected by 
an IPO? 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, from this study, we can also see that there are many pros and cons in general to 
going public. Going public allows a firm to be able to go back to the public markets for 
funds and follow-on offerings. It allows a firm to further incentivize its employees 
through stock options; it allows the market to evaluate the firm for potential M&A 
options. The list of pros for going public goes is endless, yet many companies fail to 
think of the market scrutiny that accompanies the initial public offering. Once the 
company has consecutive poor quarters and fails to live up to earnings expectations, the 
company can be made cheaper for possible takeovers, and management can easily lose its 
                                                 
21 E&Y Study. 
22 “Taking Your Company Public.” http://www.wienerboerse.at/cms/2/43/14. 
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jobs. Next, a young company can seemingly lack a solid investor relations department 
that is needed to make the company transparent to the market. The firm is no longer in 
the hands of its “entrepreneur” and founder;” rather, the company faces constant pressure 
to meet numbers expectations, and cannot pursue far-reaching ideas without regards to 
the “bottom line.”      
 
In our study, the companies that succeeded seemed to have an obvious and identifiable 
theme in the market well before its public offering. The companies had a growth plan and 
strategy in place for the next 3-5 years well aligned with the funds it so desired to race. It 
could easily highlight past wins, investments, solid management teams, and milestones 
preceding its public offering, which was a sign that the company could function as a 
successful private company as well (wasn’t in dire need of access to public funds). The 
firms’ financials (Revenues, R&D goals, Future EPS, and bottom-line ROE and NOI) 
had been solid in the years preceding and post public offering.  
 
Finally, there is an extensive amount of research still yet to be done in order to study the 
organizational culture and structure of the above companies. Investigating the level of 
happiness of each of the employees in the company could have an interesting correlation 
with the overall performance of the company in the market. Ultimately, it seems that it is 
very difficult to derive hard and cold facts about why some companies succeed in their 
IPO performance and others fail. Some of the companies that failed did excel in some of 
the key dimensions we studied and were simply victim to either poor market timing and 
or macroeconomic shocks.  
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